Monthly Archives: March 2014

Development plan planning policies to be interpreted by courts to ensure consistency but with flexibility

Policies in [the development plan] are to secure consistency and direction in the exercise of discretionary powers, while, at the same time, allowing a measure of flexibility.

As such the meaning of the plan is not a matter which each planning authority may decide as it pleases from time to time, so long only as it acts rationally.

Quite the contrary, policy statements should be interpreted objectively per the language used, and always read in their proper context.

In some cases, the words in a policy may “speak for themselves”. In such cases how they apply to particular factual situations will usually be a matter of judgment for the planning authority and only liable to review on the usual narrow public law grounds e.g. irrationality.

Section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”) provides that, where a local planning authority refuses an application for planning permission, the applicant may appeal to the Secretary of State.

Section 288 provides that, if any person is aggrieved by a decision made under section 78 on the grounds that it was not within the powers conferred by the 1990 Act, or that any relevant requirements were not complied with, they may make an application to the High Court.

The Court of Appeal case of Ashburton Trading Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor [2014] was an appeal from the High Court which had allowed the appeal of the London Borough of Islington (“the Council”) under section 288 of the 1990 Act and quashed the decision of the Secretary of State, on the recommendation of the planning inspector, to grant Ashburton Trading Limited (“Ashburton”) planning permission to construct a 25 storey building on land at 45 Hornsey Road, Islington, London N7. Ashburton is a trading division of Arsenal football club.

The court said the starting point was the correct interpretation of the Council’s development policy CS9(E).

“…..Tall buildings (above 30m high) are generally inappropriate to Islington’s predominantly medium to low level character, therefore proposals for new tall buildings will not be supported. Parts of the Bunhill and Clerkenwell key area may contain some sites that could be suitable for tall buildings, this will be explored in more detail as part of the Bunhill and Clerkenwell Area Action Plan.”

That was a question of law for the court: (Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City Council [2012] – Lord Reed). Policy statements are not to be interpreted as if they are statutory or contractual provisions.

This was not a case where the planning policy spoke for itself. There was no room for the exercise of planning judgment in determining the meaning of CS9(E).

The planning inspector’s exercise of assessing the character of the area had been unnecessary as they had duplicated that already undertaken through the CS process. The meaning of “generally” in CS9(E) was a hard-edged question of construction for the court to determine.

Policy CS9(E) did not say that tall buildings were inappropriate throughout the borough. The last sentence made that clear. It said tall buildings were generally inappropriate. By making express reference to the possibility of exceptions in the Bunhill and Clerkenwell area, CS9(E) it made it clear that, save in that area, the general rule is to be applied and tall buildings will not be supported except in that area.

But even if “generally” was surplusage, that may not point to one interpretation rather than another. The policy should not be construed with the rigour that is applied to the interpretation of statutes which have been drafted by Parliamentary draftsmen and contracts which have been drafted by lawyers.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Did surveyor refuse or neglect to act effectively under Party Wall etc Act 1996 enabling other surveyor to award own fees?

The evident purpose of section 10 of the Party Wall etc Act 1996 (“the Act”) is to avoid delay caused by the failure of one of the parties’ surveyors to act effectively in relation to a particular matter.

Section 10 of the Act says that if a surveyor appointed by a party to the dispute:

– refuses to act effectively; or

– (for a period of ten days beginning with the day on which either party, or the surveyor of the other party, serves a request on him) neglects to act effectively,

the surveyor of the other party may proceed to act without him in respect of the particular matter; and

anything done by that surveyor shall be just as effective as if he had been a surveyor appointed jointly by the parties.

In Patel & Anor v Peters & Ors [2014] the central issue was whether the appellants’ surveyor refused or neglected to act effectively, within section 10(6) or (7) of the Act, with the consequence that the respondents’ surveyor was empowered to dispense with his participation in issuing awards in respect of his own fees.

The appellants had appointed Mr Burns as their surveyor, and the respondents had appointed Mr Wright as theirs. The two surveyors selected Mr Alex Frame as third surveyor.

Each of the awards made under the proceedings contained a clause providing that the appellants were to pay Mr Wright’s reasonable expenses in connection with the preparation of the award and one subsequent inspection, “the quantum of such expenses to be agreed or awarded by any 2 of the 3 surveyors”.

Whilst that clause claimed to lay down a specific machinery for fixing the expenses, the parties realised that that clause was not legally effective to replace the statutory provisions as to how costs were to be awarded.

By letters of 1, 13 and 21 December 2011, Mr Wright wrote to Mr Burns to agree appropriate fees. The last letter was relied on by the respondents as a formal request under section 10(7) of the Act. It had nevertheless agreed that the ten days’ time limit under Section 10(7) would not have expired until the public holidays had been adjusted for. It warned that Mr Wright would exercise his authority to either proceed without Mr Burns, or to get Mr Frame to progress the issue, if he did not receive an appropriate response.

Mr Burns did not respond within the 10 day period (adjusted for public holidays) specified in that request. However, he did respond soon afterwards, by letter dated 6 January 2012.

Had Mr Burns responded to the request in time?

The Court of Appeal accepted:

– that a valid response could in principle be made outside the 10 day period provided that the requesting surveyor had not already begun to act unilaterally in respect of the subject matter of the request; and

– that if that was the position the requesting surveyor could not nevertheless still proceed to act unilaterally without him.

Mr Burns had acted effectively by his letter of 6 January 2012. Whilst he refused to review Mr Wright’s timesheets, he had given a reasoned justification for that refusal and he had put forward a reasonable alternative basis on which he had said the fee should be calculated. He had engaged head-on with the subject-matter of the request and had set out his position in respect of it.

That came nowhere near to a refusal or neglect to act effectively. In fact, Mr Burns was acting effectively as the building owners’ surveyor in crystallising a dispute that had surfaced in the September 2011 email exchange and perhaps even earlier. That dispute had cried out for referral to the third surveyor.

By refusing to act on the “usual time basis” and by demanding the use of an alternative “summary assessment” method, Mr Burns was engaging with the issue of fees, not refusing to act effectively in relation to that issue.

Since the surveyor who had received the request acted effectively after the 10 day period but before relevant action had been taken by the requesting surveyor, the rationale for empowering the requesting surveyor to act unilaterally without him had disappeared and there was no reason why the normal procedures under section 10 should not apply.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Highway Authority road works within road boundaries not development unless may be significant adverse effects on environment

A “screening exercise” is an assessment which may be required under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 (the “EIA Regulations”) to decide whether an Environmental Impact Assessment (an “EIA”) is needed for a project.

The EIA Regulations require a local planning authorityto “adopt a screening opinion” either:

– on request by a developer who is inclined to carry out a development (Regulation 5) or

– where it appears to the local planning authority that a planning application falls within the scope of Schedule 1 or 2 to the EIA Regulations (Regulation 7).

The EIA Regulations fulfil EU Directive 2011/92/EU (“the EIA Directive”), whose purpose is to ensure that projects “which are likely to have significant effects on the environment” (recital 7) have an EIA carried out on them.

“Significant effects” extend beyond detrimental effects. So a thing that improves the environment may be subject to the requirement for an EIA.

EIAs aim to provide information in a form accessible to the public so they can evaluate the implications of the project and take part in decision-making (recitals 16, 17 and 19).

So The Directive provides a procedural guarantee that an interested party will get the information it needs in a systematic form.

Jackson v Norfolk County Council [2014] concerned the Grapes Hill Road Scheme which involved moving traffic over onto the central reservation and adding a bus lane. No traffic was diverted elsewhere.

It also challenged the Chapel Field North Road Scheme which would give a reduction in overall traffic. It expected noise and vibration to be reduced.

The primary ground for the application for Judicial Review was that the defendant failed to undertake a legally competent screening exercise in relation to those proposals.

The High Court accepted the defendant’s case that neither scheme was “development” within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and therefore the EIA Regulations, because of the terms of section 55 (2) (b) of that Act, which excepts from the definition of development:

“the carrying out on land within the boundaries of a road by a highway authority of any works required for the maintenance or improvement of the road but, in the case of any such works which are not exclusively for the maintenance of the road, not including any works which may have significant adverse effects on the environment”.

Although not “exclusively for the maintenance of the road”, these 2 schemes could not be said to be ones that “may have significant adverse effects on the environment”.

So highway authority road works within the boundaries of a road are not development unless they may have significant adverse effects on the environment.

This may sound a bit circular as a ground for exempting a proposal from the requirement for an EIA as how else are these adverse effects to be assessed?

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Maladministration of planning authority on development. Judicial Review upholds 80% pay out reduction

A district council has paid a complainant only 20% of a £250,000 sum recommended by the Local Government Ombudsman and fought off a judicial review challenge to its decision not to pay.

In Nestwood Homes Developments Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v South Holland District Council [2014] the council took enforcement action against the developer contrary to legal advice and national planning policy guidance.

Based on plans that clearly showed raised site levels a council officer had confirmed that conditions attached to planning permission had been satisfied. So Nestwood started building works.

Neighbours complained. The council told Nestwood that it did not have planning permission for raised site levels.

The company resisted, so the council got counsel’s opinion. This was that the local authority had granted planning permission for the raised levels and that permission would remain valid if not quashed by judicial review.

Nestwood said that the council’s actions had caused significant loss to the business, distress to individual buyers concerned and reputational damage amounting to £1.2m.

The authority’s decision whether or not to accept and act on the Ombudsman’s recommendations on remedies is governed by usual, general public law requirements of good faith, rationality, fairness and so on. The rationality of a proposed response has to be assessed taking account of the binding findings of maladministration, injustice and loss which have been made.

Nestwood claimed:

i) The Council failed to provide adequate reasons;

ii) The Council gave excessive weight to the issue of the affordability of a payment and failed to take relevant considerations properly into account;

iii) The Council took the decision in an unfair way, in that it did not afford Nestwood an opportunity to make oral or written representations;

iv) The Council gave the appearance of predetermination and unfairness and a closed mind;

v) The decision was irrational and perverse.

The High Court said maladministration ombudsman findings do not have the same effect as those as to some other breach of public or private law duty.

The Ombudsman’s recommendation had to be taken very seriously by the authority but it leaves scope for that authority to have regard to other pressing aspects of the public interest in deciding whether or not to accept and act upon the recommendation.

The court ruled the council had given sufficient reasons.

What was affordable was not an exact science – “it is matter of evaluative judgment” in “the context of the local authority’s finances in this case” not for “precise calculation or elaborate explanation”. On affordability, the financial constraints were severe and the council was entitled to give them significant weight.

Though the amount of the payment was close to the lowest acceptable the council had not behaved irrationally or unlawfully in weighing the competing factors as it had.

On fairness, the High Court said the council did make the chief executive’s report available before the meeting and did give Nestwood an opportunity to make written representations. The obligation to act fairly involved no more than this – the council was not duty bound to give the company an opportunity to make oral representations at the council meeting.

On the suggestion of predetermination, the council members were entitled to have regard to affordability. They did not have a closed mind just because they had a disposition to conserve council finances to provide services in its area.

On the perversity challenge,it failed for the foregoing reasons. The Council did not act irrationally or unlawfully in making the decision it did.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Public duties under neighbourhood scheme prevailed over Landlord obligations

In Shebelle Enterprises Ltd v The Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust Ltd [2014] Shebelle owned a high class leasehold residential property. The Trust was the Landlord. The lease contained a Landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment.

The Trust had powers of control over development in the neighbourhood derived from a statutory neighbourhood scheme.

Shebelle said a neighbouring freehold development within the statutory scheme would cause substantial damage to its property and said the Trust would be acting in breach of that covenant if it granted consent to that development.

The court ruled that the proper exercise for the public good of the Trust’s powers of control over the contested development could not constitute a breach of the covenant.

No reasonable parties to the lease would have thought that the proper and bona fide performance by the Trust of its duties under an arrangement such as the Scheme could amount to a breach of the Landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment.

The Scheme, which was sanctioned by the High Court, placed the Trust under a duty to consider and act in the public interest and for the benefit of the Suburb as a whole.

The proper performance by the Trust of its public duties under the Scheme could not amount to the Landlord Trust taking away with one hand what had been given to Shebelle through the Lease with the other.

There was nothing implicit in the Lease that could prevent the Trust properly performing its duties under the Scheme in this way.

On the contrary, it was merely performing its public interest duty, sanctioned by the High Court under a statutory scheme, to preserve the character and amenities of the Suburb, and as such was entirely consistent with the agreement embodied in the Lease.

Had Shebelle been right, it would have fettered the Trust’s exercise of its powers under the Scheme since it would permit a leaseholder within the Scheme to contend that a particular development would substantially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of his property irrespective of whether that development was in the wider public interest. Perversely a freeholder within the Scheme would not have the same privilege as they would not have the benefit of a leasehold covenant for quiet enjoyment.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Caravan may have had implied licence allowing planning appeal against enforcement notice

Only a person having an interest in the land to which an enforcement notice relates or a relevant occupier may appeal against an enforcement notice under Section 174(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

Having an interest in the land means having a legal ownership or a beneficial ownership eg as a beneficiary under a trust.

A relevant occupier must occupy the land by virtue of a licence both when the enforcement notice is issued and remain as such when the appeal is brought.

In Flynn v Secretary of State for the Communities and Local Government (2014) the claimant had parked her caravan on a private access.

The court held that a licence meant permission to enter and occupy the land. This could be oral or written and it could be express or implied.

An implied one could be implied or inferred from the circumstances.

Clearly the claimant here had neither an interest in the land nor an express licence but the Planning Inspector had failed to consider whether the claimant had an implied licence so the appeal decision against the claimant was quashed,

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Electricity Wayleave compensation included reduced value caused by loss of residential development contract

The Court of Appeal case of National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v Arnold White Estates Ltd [2014] will make power utilities think twice about holding onto the existing routes of their power lines where these impede development.

The respondent had contracted to sell two parcels of land for residential development.

One of these related to a strip and was conditional on the removal of an overhead power line. Due to indexation the price had risen to £5.82m.

When the respondent gave notice terminating the current wayleave, the appellant electricity company applied for and got a statutory wayleave to retain the power line so the conditional contract lapsed.

Planning permission had been got for the land but the conditions precluded development with the power lines still there.

The sole issue was how much compensation was payable to the respondent under para 7 of Schedule 4 to the Electricity Act 1989.

The respondent said it ought to be the value of the land under the contract at the date of the new wayleave notionally free of the new wayleave minus the nominal value of the land at the date of the new wayleave as it actually was i.e. encumbered by that new wayleave.

The date was critical as by 2010 the value of residential land was much less than the contract had provided for.

The Court of Appeal, held that the respondent had been correct in the basis upon which it had claimed compensation.

AWE had crystallised the development value by the two sale contracts made in July 2007, by reference to development values then prevailing.

Nothing in paragraph 7 of schedule 4, precluded compensation for the loss of contractual rights caused by the grant of a wayleave from the compensation afforded by the 1989 Act. In fact, the right to compensation under paragraph 7(1) was conferred in the most general terms.

The only limitation was that the loss claimed for must be loss suffered by the claimant in his capacity as owner or occupier of the land, rather than in some wholly unrelated capacity.

So there would be no compensation for loss suffered betting on the outcome of an application to the Secretary of State under paragraph 6 for the grant of a wayleave, even if the bet was placed and lost by the owner or occupier of the land.

The loss of this contractual right to proceeds of the sale under a conditional contract for the sale of the land, where the contract lapsed because of the grant of the wayleave, was a loss suffered by AWE in its capacity as owner of the land.

It was a right inseparable from the seller’s status as owner of the land in question.

Compensation was to be based upon the special value of the land to the owner rather than its objective market value.

The court commented that future tribunals would be astute to detect and defeat any collusive attempts to manufacture artificially high land contract prices ahead of the grant of wayleaves for the purposes of generating an inflated level of compensation.

This blog has been posted as a matter of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Parents’ Council House Discount highlights need for comprehensive trust deeds on joint property purchases

Where property is bought by more than one person, and they are not husband and wife, it is important to have a trust deed setting out (or providing for) the shares the property will be held in and how the income (usually any rent) and outgoings (including mortgage payments, maintenance costs and council tax) will be shared between the parties and reflected in those shares.

In the Court of Appeal case of Richards v Wood (2014) Mr Richards’ parents in law (the respondents) did not have enough money to buy their council house so Mr Richards agreed to provide a large chunk of the purchase price.

At the time of the purchase Mr and Mrs Woods’ long tenancy of the house had qualified them for a significant statutory discount.

There was a trust deed which said the parties would be entitled to share in the house in proportion to their contributions.

It said:

“3. At the date of the said transfer the market value of the property agreed with the Oldham Borough Council was £23,500. The agreed discount to which the purchasers were entitled was £14,100 and the purchase price paid by the purchasers to the council was therefore £9,400. Part of the said purchase price of £5,000 has been provided by Mr Richards and the balance of £4,400 by the purchasers.”

Clause B of the trust deed said that on the sale of the property the proceeds would be divided:

“on the basis of the initial respective contributions set out in clause 3 above provided always that if the purchasers or Mr Richards shall expend further monies on the property by way of improvement such monies shall be regarded as an increase in the interest of the person so providing the same and shall be taken into account in any division of the proceeds of sale.”

In fact Mr Richards provided the whole of the £9,400.

Between August 1989 and October 1990 Mr and Mrs Wood paid for double glazing to be installed at a cost to them of £3,878.

In 2006 the house was valued with a view to it being sold and the Mr Richards beng paid out. The agent said a reasonable asking price would be £114,950 but that they would be “happy to ask slightly higher if you wish.” Their marketing fee would have been 1.5 per cent of the price achieved.

But Mr and Mrs Wood did not place the property for sale on the open market. Instead, Mr and Mrs Wood sold the house to their son, Michael and his wife Janet. The sale price was £102,000.

Mr and Mrs Wood and Mr Richards fell out over the valuation and how the proceeds were to be shared.

Mr Richards’ valuer arrived at a value of £111,000 and Mr and Mrs Woods’ arrived at a value of £105,000. However, they agreed that “the difference between their valuations was within an acceptable range of tolerance” as between chartered surveyors’ valuations and that since the sale did not involve an estate agent and deduction of their commission charges the agreed price was within a reasonable negotiation range of the market value.

So the court dismissed Mr Richards’ undervalue claim.

The question also arose whether Mr Richards was entitled to share in the statutory discount or whether it was to be treated as part of Mr and Mrs Woods’ contribution augmenting their own share in the house.

If there is no express provision in the trust deed that deals with the way in which an entitlement to statutory discount is to be treated, the courts have usually held that it is to be treated as a contribution in monies’ worth to the purchase price and here the court found that the discount was to be treated as a contribution by Mr and Mrs Wood.

This aspect of the litigation could have been avoided had the attribution of the discount been expressly covered in the trust deed.

Mr Richards argued that the expenditure on double glazing was only to be taken into account in any division of the sale proceeds and only to the extent that it added value at the time of the sale, and, that it was a repair, rather than an improvement to be credited to Mr and Mrs Wood.

But the court rejected this because the trust deed directed the spender’s increased interest in the property to be geared to the monies spent, not the value added. So the historic cost of the double glazing had been correctly deducted from what would otherwise have been Mr Richards’ share of the proceeds of sale.

Also it was an improvement because Mr and Mrs Wood had cared for the previous windows and they had not needed repairing.

This blog has been posted as a matter of general interest.It does not remove the need get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Meaning of Commercially Reasonable as a requirement of Commercial and Property Legal Documents

The term “commercially reasonable” was recently litigated in the context of determinations made by parties to financial instruments. Even here much will turn on the sub context of the particular document and the circumstances. The term is sometimes used in property documents and this case may provide some assistance as to its meaning though again the context will be important.

In Barclays Bank Plc v Unicredit Bank Ag & Anor [2014] Unicredit were paying Barclays premiums for guarantees given by Barclays. These enabled Unicredit to lay off certain credit risks and reduce their capital requirements.

The lifetime of two of the guarantees was 11 years and 19 years for the other guarantee, but provisions were agreed entitling Unicredit (in events that were likely to occur) to bring them to an end after a period which was expected to be about 5 years. Barclays could therefore expect to earn five years’ premiums and fees under the guarantees.

Clause 12.1 of the guarantees granted Unicredit a right of optional termination in four separate events, two of which required Barclays’ prior consent “such consent to be determined by [Barclays] in a commercially reasonable manner.”

The person who had to act in a commercially reasonable manner was “the Guarantor” namely Barclays itself.

It was the manner of the determination which must be commercially reasonable. It did not follow that the outcome had to be commercially reasonable although, if it was not, that would no doubt cause the court to look critically at the manner of the determination.

In determining whether or not to consent to early termination, could Barclays take account of its own interest in preference to the interest of Unicredit?

It could, because any commercial man whose consent was required to a course of action would think it commercially reasonable to have primary regard to his own commercial interests.

Of course the requirement that consent be determined in a commercially reasonable manner must be intended to be some kind of a control.

So, if, Barclays had said that they would not consent at any price or if it had said that they wanted 11 years’ (or 19 years’) fees as being the full term of the guarantees, that might well not have been “commercially reasonable”.

But that was not the position here.

It was not easy to specify a test for commercial reasonableness for the purpose of this or other contracts generally but it could be tentatively said that it would not be acting in a commercially reasonable manner to demand a price which was way above what they could reasonably have anticipated would have been a reasonable return from the contract being prematurely terminated.

The price which Barclays demanded for its consent here could not be said to have been determined by it in a commercially unreasonable manner.

It was entitled to have regard to its own commercial interest. It did not refuse consent outright. The price it sought was not out of line with the reasonable return it could have expected had the contract run its expected course.

This blog has been posted as a matter of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Tenant holding over at end of lease was tenancy at will, not protected yearly tenancy

Where a tenant remains in property after the expiry of a lease which has been contracted out of security of tenure, the tenant is generally a “tenant at sufferance” until the landlord consents to the tenant remaining. At that point the tenant will become at the very least a tenant at will.

The tenant’s continuing to pay the rent is still consistent with that tenant remaining a tenant at will with that tenancy being terminable immediately on notice by either party.

This applies even if the rent payable under the expired lease was an annual rent.

The payment of rent gives rise to no automatic presumption of a yearly or other periodic tenancy.

Instead the parties’ contractual intentions are to be decided by looking objectively at all relevant circumstances.

In the Court of Appeal case of Erimus Housing Ltd v Barclays Wealth Trustees (Jersey) Ltd & Ors [2014] EHL stayed on after expiry of a lease which had been contracted out of security of tenure. But BWT contended that EHL held over under a periodic yearly tenancy which could not be terminated except by at least six months’ notice served to expire on 31 October 2013.

So by May 2012 it had been too late for them to serve an effective contractual notice for 31 October 2012.

In June EHL had served a notice to end the lease on 31 August 2012.

BWT said that the periodic yearly tenancy arose between January 2010 and June 2011 when the negotiations for a new tenancy to be contracted out of security of tenure had stalled.

However an e-mail of 16 November 2010 confirmed that both parties had continued to work on the assumption that a new lease would be granted.

Though the negotiations were painfully slow, they were never given up. In fact in June 2011 they reached agreement on the terms for the new lease.

None of this squared with the creation of a new yearly tenancy in advance of the grant of a new lease and certainly not with one which would be protected under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.

The key fact here was that the parties were in negotiation for the grant of a new formal lease.

Here the courts will tend to infer that the parties did not intend to enter into any intermediate contractual arrangement inconsistent with remaining parties to ongoing negotiations.

In most cases it will be concluded that the occupier remained a tenant at will pending the execution of the new lease.

The inference is likely to be even stronger when any periodic tenancy would carry with it statutory protection under the 1954 Act.

In the present case the intended new lease, like the old lease, was to be contracted out. This made the last point an even stronger inference against BWT’s contention that there had been an intermediate periodic tenancy as opposed to a tenancy at will.

This blog has been posted as a matter of general interest. It does not remove the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.