Category Archives: Landlord & Tenant Law

Flat Landlord not responsible for Tenant fall in Common Parts

Where a lease is a lease of a dwelling-house which forms part only of a building, then, under section 11 (1A) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 there is implied into the tenancy agreement a compulsory contractual covenant by the lessor to keep in repair the structure and exterior of the dwelling-house and the structure and exterior of any part of the building in which the lessor has an estate or interest (including drains, gutters and external pipes).

In Edwards v Kumarasamy [2015] Mr Kumarasamy’s assured shorthold tenant of his Flat 10, Mr Edwards, had tripped on an external paved area forming part of the apartment block’s common parts. Although he did not own them, Mr Kumarasamyh had a legal easement to use the front hall, the car parking space and Bin Store and other facilities provided by the head landlord.

The Court of Appeal found that this gave him an “estate or interest” in the paved area where Mr Edwards sustained his accident.

Was that enough to bring the extended covenant into play?

The Court of Appeal said Mr Kumarasamy’s legal easement over the front hall meant that the front hall was a part of a building in which he had an estate or interest.

In Brown v Liverpool Corporation [1983] the Court of Appeal held that steps leading to the front door of a self contained dwelling were part of the exterior of the dwelling.

In the current case, the paved area which led from the front door of the apartment block to the car park was not part of the exterior of Flat 10. However, the paved area was both short and also part of the essential means of access to the front hall in which Mr Kumarasamy did have an estate or interest because of his easement to use it. So the court ruled that the paved area could properly be described as the exterior of the front hall.

Mr Kumarasamy said Mr Edwards should have given him notice of the uneven paving stone and a reasonable opportunity to fix it but the court said such a qualification could not be implied here because the defect was outside the property actually let to Mr Edwards.

So the extended Landlord’s covenant applied to the paved area and Mr Kumarasamy was liable to Mr Edwards under it for the defect.

The Supreme Court has, in Edwards v Kumarasamy [2016] , overturned the Court of Appeal decision:

“….. that decision was wrong. The fact that a piece of property is a necessary means of access to a building cannot be sufficient for it to constitute part of the exterior of that building. Steps separated from the outside of a building by a two metre path cannot, as a matter of ordinary English, be said to be part of the exterior of that building.”

So it was strictly unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by the appeal.

However the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that Mr Kumarasamy had an “estate or interest” in the paved area where Mr Edwards sustained his accident. But said that the repairing covenant implied by section 11 was to be interpreted and applied in precisely the same way as a landlord’s contractual repairing covenant. The rule in relation to such covenants was that, until he has notice of disrepair a landlord should not normally be liable for disrepair of property.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Proportionality assessment did not apply to private possession claim

In the Supreme Court case of McDonald v McDonald and others [2016] Fiona McDonald, was aged 45 and suffered from a personality disorder. In May 2005 her parents bought 25 Broadway Close, Witney (“the property”), with the aid of a mortgage from Capital Home Loans Ltd (“CHL”)

Her respondents granted her a series of assured shorthold tenancies of the property, culminating in one granted in July 2008 for a term of one year. Miss McDonald continued to live at the property.

The parents got into arrears with CHL and do did Miss McDonald’s rent. CHL appointed Receivers of the property. The Receivers subsequently served a notice, in the name of Miss McDonald’s parents, on Miss McDonald indicating they would be re-possessing the property. When that notice expired, they issued possession proceedings in the name of the parents.

Miss McDonald said that the court should have taken into account the proportionality of making an order for possession, for the purposes of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR), and, that that would have entitled the court to withhold making an order for possession despite being apparently mandated to do so by section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”) and section 89(1) of the Housing Action 1980 (“the 1980 Act”), which restricts how long a court can postpone an order for possession taking effect.

The Supreme Court faced three issues:

1. whether section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”) and article 8 of the ECHR required a court to consider the proportionality of evicting the occupier when entertaining a claim for possession by a private sector owner against a residential occupier;

2. if the answer to 1. was yes, whether the relevant legislation, in particular section 21(4) of the 1988 Act, can be read so as to comply with that conclusion; and

3. whether, if the answer to 1 and 2 was yes, the trial judge would have been entitled to dismiss the claim for possession in this case, as he said he would have done, on the grounds that the claim for possession was disproportionate.

The Supreme Court said where the party seeking possession is a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the HRA the occupier can raise the question of the proportionality of making an order for possession. However in the case of Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011], the Supreme Court made it clear that it’s judgment had no application to cases where the person seeking possession was a private landowner.

The Supreme Court’s preliminary view was that it is unarguable for a tenant to say article 8 overrides the contractual relationship between the parties, at least where the legislative provisions of a democratically elected domestic legislature has balanced the competing interests of private sector landlords and residential tenants. Otherwise, the ECHR would be directly enforceable between private citizens so as to alter their contractual rights and obligations.

As to 2. above, had the court been persuaded that Miss McDonald was right on issue 1., a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA would have been the only remedy.

As to 3, the judge had not considered whether, if the claim for possession had been disproportionate, there might have been other solutions to the problem than dismissing the claim.

Where (rarely) a court was required to assess the proportionality of making a possession order, it’s powers to suspend or postpone the effect of that order are much restricted by section 89(1) of the 1980 Act.

Very few cases justified a refusal, as opposed to a postponement, of a possession order and could only be cases where the gravity of the interference in the occupier’s right to respect for their home heavily outweighed the landlord’s interest in regaining possession.

Here, it seemed likely that on a proportionality assessment the most Miss McDonald could hope for would have been an order for possession in six weeks’ time – the maximum permitted by section 89(1) of the 1980 Act.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Landlords should have given tenant new address for service

Many cases concern the validity of notices served by tenants where they seek to exercise a contractual break clause.

Leases frequently incorporate the regulations as to service of notices contained in section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

Section 196 provides:

…(3) Any notice required or authorised by this Act to be served shall be sufficiently served if it is left at the last-known place of abode or business in the United Kingdom of the lessee, lessor, mortgagee, mortgagor, or other person to be served…

(4) Any notice required or authorised by this Act to be served shall also be sufficiently served, if it is sent by post in a registered letter addressed to the lessee, lessor, mortgagee, mortgagor, or other person to be served, by name, at the aforesaid place of abode or business…”

The principal purposes of a service provision are:

– to set out a practicable method by which a party serving a notice can be reasonably sure how he should do so, and

– that the party to be served can be reasonably sure he will receive it.

The address given by a party as his own address serves both these purposes- it gives clarity to the party serving.

In giving that address, the party to be served has made his own decision as to the likelihood of documents sent to that address actually coming to his attention.

If circumstances change, he has the capacity to inform the other party of any new address.

If he does not do so, it is not unreasonable that any risk that the documents do not actually reach him falls on him.

He cannot be heard to object that an address might not be considered to be a “place of abode or business”.

Terms like that are to be construed in the context against which they are used. “Abode” may include premises at which an individual carries on business but does not reside, so it is not necessarily resticted to residential premises.

Where the intended recipient is a company, it cannot mean a residential address.

There is no reason why that term should not extend to an address nominated by a person.

If a party nominates a residential property to receive a notice, it is then a matter for him and not his contractual counterparty whether he in fact lives there.

If a party nominates non-residential property, it is equally a matter for him what connection he has with it, and whether it relates to any business of his or not.

Nor can he be heard to object that he in fact carries on little or no business there. If he chooses to describe it as his address, the nature or quality of his business activity is a matter for him and not the other party.

He may for instance elect to nominate a particular address not because he himself lives or goes there for business purposes, but because he has confidence that those who do will pass on any communication they receive.

In the High Court case of Levett-Dunn & Ors v NHS Property Services Ltd [2016] the leases named three people and a professional pension trustee company “all of 75 Tyburn Rd Erdington Birmingham B24 8NB” to be the Landlord. The Tenant served break notices on them individually at that address. To be valid the notice would have had to be “given” before 11 January 2013, ie six months before the break date. The notices were expected but did not come to the Landlords’ attention until after 10 January 2013. The Landlords sought declarations that the notices were not properly served on them so that the relevant leases still existed.

The leases incorporated the regulations as to service of notices contained in section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and said service on any one of the parties comprising the Landlord should be deemed to be service on all of them.

By the date of the break notice Simon Levett-Dunn had ceased being a Landlord and had transferred the freehold to the complainant Landlords in this case but had continued with a new company at 75 Tyburn Road.

Of the three continuing Landlords Frederick Levett-Dunn had not operated from 75 Tyburn Road since 1999. Mr Evans did not run a business from that property and the professional trustee company had never run a business from that property. At the date of the leases in 2010 Simon Levett-Dunn was the only one of the persons comprising the Landlord with any ongoing business connection with the premises at 75 Tyburn Road. If Frederick Levett-Dunn and Mr. Evans were prepared to continue to give 75 Tyburn Road as their address after they ceased to attend there, they must have assumed or been content that Simon Levett-Dunn would pass them anything addressed to them.

Had they wanted the notices to be served at another address they should have informed the tenant. So the break notices were validly served on them.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Inaccessibility of Landlord did not dispense with consent requirement

A tenant’s covenant not to carry out alterations without the landlord’s consent is not a covenant by the landlord to give consent, or to be available to receive requests for consent.

If the landlord cannot be found, so that consent cannot be requested, the tenant may not carry out the alterations without being in breach of covenant.

In relation to residential tenancies, section 47(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”) requires that a landlord’s name and address be included in every demand for rent and other sums payable by a tenant to his or her landlord.

Section 48(1) of the 1987 Act also requires tenants to be supplied with an address in England and Wales at which they may communicate with their landlord, including in connection with proceedings.

Where a landlord fails to comply with either section 47(1) or 48(1), sections 47(2) and 48(2) say any rent, service charges or administration charges otherwise due from the tenant to the landlord are treated as not being due until the particular requirement is complied with.

In the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) case of Raja v Aviram [2016] no rent or service charge was demanded by Mr Raja and he supplied no address to Mr Aviram.

The Tribunal said no statute said that a failure by a landlord to provide a name and address meant that a tenant could carry out alterations or take other prohibited steps without the requirement to obtain the landlord’s consent.

Here, Mr Raja could have obtained the name and address of his landlord by searching the Land Register, which he did at one point.

Even if he did not have that address by the time the works were carried out, there was simply no basis on which he was excused the obligation of seeking consent just because his reasonable efforts to locate his landlord had been unsuccessful.

A breach of covenant had been committed by the creation of at least one new hole in the wall of the building for a replacement boiler without the consent of Mr Raja.

This was still the case even though Mr Raja would have consented when satisfied that the work was to be carried out competently.

A modest breach of covenant had been committed. Given the circumstances of that breach it was extremely unlikely that this valuable lease could be forfeited without relief against forfeiture being granted. Though Mr Raja might have been entitled to nominal damages if he had gone to court.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Can a Landlord recoup defence costs and damages from own breaches?

Can a landlord recoup damages and legal costs arising from it’s own breach of covenant through a service charge?

In the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) case of Fairbairn v Etal Court Maintenance Ltd [2015] one of the services the landlord could recharge under the service charge was doing “all other acts and things for the proper management administration and maintenance of the blocks of flats as the Lessor in its sole discretion shall think fit.”

The Tribunal said such a general charging provision was, in principle, wide enough to cover the costs of legal advice or even, where appropriate, of litigation.

However a sum paid to meet a successful damages claim for breach of covenant is not expenditure on the proper management and administration of the buildings.

Also, the legal work here was not so much advice on whether repair work was within the landlord’s covenant. It was rather defending the landlord’s failure of compliance.

In short, the steps required of the landlord resulted from the landlord breaching it’s own obligations under the lease.

The landlord’s repairing covenant required it to maintain the unlet parts of the buildings, including their foundations and structure, in good and substantial repair and condition.

It was precisely because the proper management and administration of the building had been neglected, for however short, that proceedings were commenced by the tenant. So the damages and legal costs were not recoverable through the service charge.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Tenant not entitled to refund of unused prepayments under lease break clause

A “break clause” in a lease permits the tenant to terminate the lease on a date (“the break date”) prior to the last day of the term. In the same clause the landlord may well demand compensation, often in the form of a “break premium”, whose payment is made a pre-condition of a “break” under the break clause.

Where the break clause requires a break premium but says nothing about an apportionment of the rent, which the lease requires the tenant to pay in advance, can the court imply a term which requires the landlord to refund that part of the advance payment of rent which relates to the period (“the broken period”) after the break date, because by that time the lease would have terminated?

In Marks And Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd & Anor [2014] M&S operated the break clause and paid the reverse premium and sued the landlord to recover rent and charges for the broken period.

There was no express term which entitled the tenant to be repaid any sum by way of basic rent, car parking fee, insurance or service charge that the tenant had paid over and above what was attributable to the period prior to the break date.

The issue was whether a term was to be implied into the break clause that the tenant could claim back that proportion of the rent paid on the last quarter day which related to the broken period?

As the rent was reserved “proportionately for any part of year” and the quarterly payments were “installments”, the High Court had accepted the tenant’s view that that term should be implied.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the words “proportionately for any part of a year” in the rent clause might, at first sight, be read as meaning that there should be an implied term for repayment of the rent for the broken period once the break premium had been paid and termination had taken place.

However, those words were only applicable to a payment of rent for a broken period within the original term of the lease. So they did not apply where on the last quarter day there had been no certainty as to whether termination would take place on the break date.

Worse still the court said a party seeking to establish an implied term must show, not simply, that the term could be a part of the agreement but that a term would be part of the agreement.

The starting point was that, if there was no express term, none should be implied because if the parties had intended that a particular term should apply to their relationship they would have included a term to that effect, rather than left it to implication.

In such a case the usual inference is that nothing is to happen. If the parties had intended something to happen, the document would have said so.

An unexpressed term might be implied if, and only if, the court finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract. It is not enough for the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as reasonable men had it been suggested to them. It had to be a term that went without saying, a term necessary to give business efficacy to the contract.

To be implied it had to be a term which, though tacit, formed part of the contract which the parties made for themselves.

However, the fact that an agreement could work without the implied term did not rule it out being an implied term.

That would be to overlook the court’s approach to interpretation which was to seek the parties’ common aim in entering into the agreement.

A term may also be implied if it was necessary to achieve the parties’ objective in entering into the agreement, even if it was not necessary to the workings of the agreement.

It would have been obvious to the parties before they signed up to the lease that there was a possibility that rent would have to be paid on the last quarter day in full for a period which went beyond the break date. They could therefore have made some provision for this case but had not done so.

Furthermore, the presence of other clauses in the break clause dealing with the consequences of termination showed that there must have had some discussions about what was to happen on the exercise of the break clause.

That was not to say that those provisions were inconsistent with there being an implied term. But they did show that the parties could easily have added to clause 8.5 words requiring the lessor to repay any rent (or other charges) paid for the broken period.

When all the circumstances were considered, it was right to infer that the parties proceeded on the basis that the loss from a payment of rent for the broken period should lie where it fell. Thus no term for repayment was to be implied.

M&S appealed to the Supreme Court. However the Supreme Court found there to be a ‘clear, general understanding that neither the common law nor statute apportion rent payable in advance on a time basis’.

The Supreme Court could not imply any intention on the part of a landlord and tenant for the tenant to be refunded an apportioned part of the rent paid in advance.

This blog has been posted out of general interest it does not replace the need for bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Payment of lease extension completion statement did not oust LVT’s judgement on costs

By section 60 of Leasehold Reform Housing Urban Development Act 1993 (the 1993 Act) it is the enfranchising residential tenant who must pay the costs of the extension lease. Where those costs are in dispute there is a mechanism for completion to take place without resolution of that dispute. This is provided by section 56(3) of the 1993 Act.

Whether the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT) has jurisdiction depends, to some extent, on section 91(1) of the 1993 Act. It says the LVT only has jurisdiction “in default of agreement” as to the amount of costs recoverable under section 60.

In the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) case of Friends Life Ltd & Anor v Jones [2014] the central issue was whether a binding agreement as to the amount of the solicitors’ conveyancing fees occurred, or was made, when the residential tenant’s solicitor paid, without demur, the completion monies requested by the intermediate and head landlords, at completion of the extension lease, on 22 March 2013.

The Tribunal determined that there was no agreement as to costs because by its surveyor the residential tenant had five weeks earlier issued an application in the LVT under section 92(1)(d) of the 1993 Act seeking determination of the reasonable costs payable and, a week prior to the completion of the extension lease, the LVT had issued directions without hearing requiring the intermediate and head landlords to send a detailed statement of the costs which they sought under section 60(1) of the 1993 Act.

Seen in that context, the payment of the completion monies could not amount to an unequivocal acceptance of the 22 March 2013 cost figure. Rather, the payment of the full completion fees accorded with section 56(3) of the 1993 Act, which requires that where the amount of costs is not agreed the tenant cannot require completion of the extension lease without tendering the amount “so far as ascertained” of the costs for which the tenant is liable under section 60. Here the amount of the costs was “ascertained”, and full payment had been tendered and made, even if the amount of the costs had not been “agreed” because any costs in excess of £722 plus disbursements and VAT were disputed as was clear from the residential tenant’s surveyor’s section 92(1)(d) application.

In short, the payment of the costs on 22 March 2013 was merely the provision of full “security” so as to enable completion of the extension lease to take place pending the outcome of the residential tenant’s surveyor’s section 92(1)(d) application to the LVT. The fact that the tenant was acting by two representatives, or agents, did not affect that conclusion. Their separate acts were to be treated as the joint acts of the principal i.e. the residential tenant.

So the LVT had jurisdiction to decide the cost issue. That jurisdiction had not been ousted by any “agreement” as to the amount of costs recoverable under section 60.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Banksy was the Landlord’s to pass on

What term is to be implied into a lease as to the ownership of a valuable part of a let property which is justifiably removed from the property by the tenant, in accordance with the tenant’s repairing obligation, and so becomes a chattel?

Usually the term, which is to be implied, is that the chattel becomes the property of the landlord. For:

1. the default position is that every part of the property belongs to the landlord. The tenant only has a tenancy for a period of time. If the tenant thinks differently it is for the tenant to show that it is right to imply into the lease a term which leads to a contrary conclusion;

2. the mere fact that the tenant is carrying out its repairing obligation does not imply that it acquires ownership of the chattel which results from part of the property being removed;

3. even if a term could be implied that (1) waste or (2) chattels with just scrap or salvage value belong to the tenant, it did not mean that it should be implied with respect to the ownership of a chattel with a substantial value. Such a term would not be necessary, would not go without saying and would not be one that would be implied as something that might have been raised by an “officious bystander” when the terms of the lease were originally hammered out;

4. it makes no difference that the value is attributable to the spontaneous actions of a third party. Whatever solution is adopted, one party gets a windfall. Who has the better right to the windfall? Usually it will be the landlord.

In The Creative Foundation v Dreamland Leisure Ltd & Others [2015] a Mural attributed to Banksy was removed by the First Defendant (“Dreamland”) from a building at Folkestone (“the Building”). Then the wall was made good. Dreamland was the tenant of the Building.

This was done without the knowledge or permission of Stonefield Estates Ltd (“the Landlord”). The Landlord had assigned to the Claimant (“the Foundation”) its ownership of the Mural and its rights to sue Dreamland. The claim was for the return of that section of wall.

The High Court said the problem arose from the public knowledge that a Banksy had been on the site and would remain the same whether the Banksy was removed by overpainting, cleaning or removal and reinstatement of the wall. The shrine would remain a shrine, whichever method was used. So the removal of the wall was not in any event justified.

Even if it had been justified the wall would still belong to the Foundation as assignee of the Landlord’s ownership of it – under points 1-4 listed above.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Improvement notice relating to apartment block should have been served on tenants

Where an apartment block is managed by a Right to Manage (“RTM”) Company who can a local housing authority serve an improvement notice on requiring work? Can an improvement notice still be validly served on the landlord under paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 2004 (“the Housing Act”)?

In the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)case of Hastings Borough Council v Braear Developments Ltd [2015] Hastings Borough Council served an improvement notice requiring work to the common parts on Braear Developments Limited, the freeholder, and on the RTM Company.

Previous freeholders had granted long leases of the five first, second and third floors flats in the building, for a term of 99 years. The leases of the flats granted rights over the only means of access. Four of the five flats in the building were sublet on assured tenancies by the lessees. The fifth flat was not let, but if it were, the recipient of the rack-rent would be the lessee.

The Tribunal said looking at the building as a whole, the “person in control”, in the statutory sense of the person(s) in receipt of the rack rents, were the lessees of the five flats.

It would be wrong to ascribe a notional rack-rent to the common parts of the building, when there is no realistic possibility of such a rent being received.

The persons in control of the building were the lessees of the five flats.

Collectively they received the rack-rent of the building. So they satisfied the description in section 263(1) of the Housing Act.

Neither the respondent, as freeholder, nor the RTM Company could be served with an improvement notice in relation to any part of the building.

The freeholder did not qualify to receive the notice as the “person in control” of a House in Multiple Occupation (“HMO”) because it did not receive the rack-rents of the premises and so did not match the description in section 263(1) of the Housing Act. The RTM Company was in the same position.

Nor were either of the freeholder or the RTM a “person managing the building” within section 263(3) of the Housing Act. The respondent received a ground rent from the lessees, but no rent from persons who were in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises. The RTM Company received no rent at all.

So, in relation to the building as a whole, paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act required the improvement notice to be served on the lessees collectively, and, to the extent that work was required within any individual flats, it required each lessee of those flats to be served with the notice requiring that work.

Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act applies only to HMOs which are not licensed. So where a building is an HMO subject to licensing it would normally be expected that an improvement notice would be served on the person holding the licence.

This building was subject to licensing as an HMO but it was not licensed.

Had the RTM Company obtained an HMO licence under Part 2 of the Act, as it should, it would have been the appropriate person on whom an improvement notice ought to be served under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1. As it had failed to do so the notice was to be served on the lessees collectively under paragraph 2.

There may be circumstances where a local housing authority could, and might have to, serve an improvement notice in relation to common parts either on the freeholder or on some or all of the lessees of flats. Each case would turn on which of those owners “ought to take the actions specified in the notice” in the circumstances. For example, where an RTM company has the management the freeholder would have no power to undertake works and no entitlement to recoup the costs of works from lessees.

Here, the better course would be to direct any improvement notice at those lessees who are members of the RTM company and who are therefore collectively able to control the RTM company’s decisions. Usually the RTM company would be able to carry out the works and to recoup their costs under service charges.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.

Housing: Corresponding date rule validated Right to Manage Claim Notice

An application may be made for the appointment of a manager of leasehold housing under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (“2002 Act”).

Section 80 of the 2002 Act prescribes that the claim notice:

– must specify a date, at least one month after “the relevant date”, by which each person who was given the notice under section 79(6) may respond to it by giving a counter-notice under section 84 (Section 80(6)) and

– must specify a date, at least three months after that specified as above, on which the Right To Manage company (“RTM company”) intends to acquire the right to manage the premises (Section 80(7)).

In the Upper Tribunal Lands Chamber) case of Windermere Court Kenley RTM Company Ltd v Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd [2014] “the relevant date” was the 29th August 2013, when the claim notice was given, and the 30th September 2013 was the date specified under section 80(6) and the 31st December 2013 was the date specified under section 80(7).

Issue: whether a specified date of 31st December 2013 satisfied the requirements of section 80(7) or whether the earliest date it could have been was 1st January 2014.

The Tribunal said:

– The corresponding date in the following month or months was to be used as the date of calculation particularly where, as here, there was one.

– The application of the corresponding date rule in this case required that the start time specified for the RTM company must be a date ‘after’ midnight on 30th-31st December 2013.

– The start-time the claim notice specified for the RTM company was 31st December 2013.

– 31st December was the day ‘after’ midnight on 30th-31st.

Accordingly specifying 31st December 2013 as being the first day three months “after” the 30th September 2013 satisfied the requirements of section 80(7). So the claim notice complied with the provisions of section 80 of the 2002 Act.

This blog has been posted out of general interest. It does not replace the need to get bespoke legal advice in individual cases.